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Abstract1 
 
This paper takes stock of the European Union's attempts to 'externalize' its internal 
market and examines the political dimensions of this strategy. It shows that the 
policies, polity and politics of third countries' involvement with the internal market 
vary considerably. The 'export' of internal market norms is most extensive in the EU's 
neighbourhood such as the European Economic Area, the EU-Turkey customs union, 
the European Neighbourhood Policy or the Stabilization and Association Process. The 
author argues that the broader, the more institutionalized and acquis-based the 
relationship between the Union and a third country, the more likely it constitutes a 
deep, dynamic and tight form of cooperation which, as a consequence, is likely to 
raise legitimacy concerns for the EU's partners. These concerns for input legitimacy 
may only partially and in the short to medium term be balanced by increased output 
legitimacy.  
 
 
 
                                                            
1   An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference The Internal Market in a 
'Tri-disciplinary' Perspective, EU-Consent Network of Excellence, College of Europe, Bruges, 
25-26 April 2007. The author would like to thank the participants for their valuable 
comments.  Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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The Internal Market's External Dimension: from Disregard to Active Pursuit 
 
Over the past two decades, the European Union's attitude towards the external 
dimension of its internal market has changed dramatically. In the mid-1980s the 
Community focused almost exclusively on internal aspects of completing its 
common market. Yet, demands from its trading partners and constraints from the 
international trade regime forced the Community to address the external dimension 
as well and, inter alia, lead to the conclusion of many bilateral and multilateral 
agreements with third countries since the 1990s. In recent years, the EU has 
increasingly taken a proactive stance on the promotion of its internal market norms. 
One may even speak of an 'externalization' of the internal market, especially in the 
Union's 'near abroad'.  
 
Whereas the concepts of free trade areas and customs unions have been in use for 
a very long time (see e.g. Article 24 GATT), the notion of an internal market has 
largely remained unspecified in international economic law (and political science). 
Since the Single European Act, Article 14(2) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community defines the internal market as "an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital is ensured". The creation 
of such a market involves both national liberalization removing discrimination 
(negative integration) and (re-)regulation at the European level: "a common market 
attains the free movement of products, services and factors of production 
accompanied by the necessary positive integration for the common market to 
function properly" (Pelkmans 2006: 8).2  
 
The White Paper did not directly address the external dimension of the internal 
market.3 The Community's general attitude was inward looking as European 
governments and business had to be convinced that the ambitious '1992 
programme' could be realized.4 It was the Community's main trading partners, 
especially the United States and the EFTA countries, that placed the external 
dimension on the political agenda by voicing concerns over the effects that the 
                                                            
2   From a legal point of view, the concept of the 'internal market' is often described as being 
narrower than that of a 'common market' even though this distinction is not always clearly 
held up even by the European Court of Justice. In particular, the internal market is said 
not to embrace "a completed external trade policy, a system of undistorted competition 
within the common market, and the harmonization or co-ordination of legislation for 
reasons other than the elimination of barriers between national markets" (Gormley 2002: 
518). 
3   It only states that "the commercial identity of the Community must be consolidated so 
that our trading partners will not be given the benefit of a wider market without 
themselves making similar concessions" and suggests the abolition of residual national or 
regional import quotas (European Commission 1985: 8, 11).  
4   The Commission deliberately chose to neglect the internal market's external dimension in 
order to avoid opening a Pandora's box. I thank Jacques Bourgeois for this specification. EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2007 
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completion of the internal market would have on them.5 In an attempt to dispel their 
fears, the Hannover European Council in June 1988 declared that "the internal 
market should not close in on itself" but "be open to third countries" in conformity with 
GATT provisions and "seek to preserve the balance of advantages accorded, while 
respecting the unity and the identity of the internal market" (European Council 1988: 
165). The Commission subsequently began to examine this external dimension. In 
October 1988 it set out the principles that '1992' would be of benefit to member 
states and third countries alike, that it would not mean protectionism, that the 
Community would meet its international obligations, and that it would help 
strengthen the multilateral system on a reciprocal basis (European Commission 1988: 
1-2). With a view to the Uruguay Round, the Commission concluded that "the 
Community will seek a greater liberalisation of international trade: the 1992 Europe 
will not be a fortress Europe but a partnership Europe" (ibid.: 1).  
 
On the one hand, the '1992 programme' thus shifted the internal market regime to 
the Community's external borders, for instance by abolishing the remaining national 
quantitative restrictions on third-country imports.6 On the other hand, the EU 
increasingly exported the regime beyond its borders (e.g. by prohibiting new 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o r  m e a s u r e s  h a v i n g  e q u i v a l e n t  e f f e c t  o n  i m p o r t s  i n  t r a d e  
agreements). Together with the end of the Cold War that gave rise to a spread of 
market economies and neoliberal policies, the completion of the internal market 
triggered a series of preferential EU agreements with third countries as well as efforts 
of regionalization in other areas of the world (Sapir 2000). The EU negotiated the 
European Economic Area (EEA) with the EFTA countries, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership with the southern Mediterranean countries, Europe Agreements with the 
Central and Eastern European countries, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
with the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a customs union 
agreement with Turkey and bilateral free trade agreements with non-European 
emerging markets.  
 
                                                            
5    For an analysis of the internal market's external dimension at the time, see Eeckhout 
(1991).  
6   The neglect of the external dimension of the internal market also resulted in a lack of 
coordination between internal and external policies. For instance, the Commission's 
endeavor in the Lomé IV negotiations to preserve the ACP countries' interests in spite of 
the replacement of national quotas by common regimes lead to a prolonged dispute 
over banana imports (McMahon 1993), and the disjuncture between international and 
internal market norms for air transport services brought about a sub-optimal liberalization 
(Bernard 2006). Overall, the '1992' agenda did not build a 'Fortress Europe' but had the 
rather unintended consequence of opening external trade by introducing 
decisionmaking rules that rendered the maintenance of trade barriers more difficult 
(Hanson 1998).  Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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Today, the EU fully acknowledges the external dimension of the internal market. The 
Commission stresses that globalization "increasingly blurs the distinction between the 
internal and external markets" and that the challenge was "to respond to the 
dynamism and change that flows directly from Europe's engagement with the world 
economy" (European Commission 2007b: 4). The internal market "will never be 
'finalised' or 'complete'" because it is constantly adapting to new realities and 
because gaps remain, rules are not always fully implemented and enforced, and 
new types of barriers emerge as markets evolve (ibid.: 3). Moreover, for the internal 
market to function properly, the EU must ensure that its principles are adequately 
reflected in international relations. Together with the member states, the Commission 
promotes internal market norms when negotiating international agreements or 
enlargements, in regulatory dialogues with third countries and in the international 
fora dealing with internal market policies such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) or the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision.  
 
This paper examines the political dimensions of the European Union's attempts to 
'externalize' its internal market. I show that the policies, polity and politics of third 
countries' involvement with the internal market, that is the coverage, degree of 
institutionalization and of alignment with the acquis, vary considerably. The export of 
internal market norms is most extensive in the EU's neighbourhood. By and large, it 
can be argued that the broader, the more acquis-based and institutionalized the 
relationship between the Union and a third country, the more likely it constitutes a 
deep (covering behind-the-border issues), dynamic (taking into account the 
evolution of the acquis) and tight (mirroring EU institutions) form of cooperation 
which, as a consequence, is likely to raise legitimacy concerns for the country 
concerned. Conversely, the narrower, the less institutionalized and acquis-based the 
relationship, the more likely it constitutes a shallow, static and loose form of 
cooperation that should not provoke many worries about its legitimacy.  
 
The EU's motivations to 'export' its internal market norms are manifold: to prepare 
European countries for accession, to promote goals of foreign and security or 
development policy, to pursue own commercial interests (e.g. opening new markets, 
neutralizing trade diversion effects of competing free trade agreements or building 
strategic links with emerging markets), to further regional integration and region-to-
region agreements or to shape the international regulatory framework for trade and 
investment, including 'WTO+' issues (Woolcock 2007: 3-4). In the Commission's words, 
the internal market "needs to position itself, by fostering the development of quality 
rules and standards which shape global norms, to allow European citizens and 
businesses to take advantage of the opportunities of globalisation" (European EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2007 
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Commission 2007b: 4). Externalization thus serves to promote broadly defined EU 
interests on a regional or global scale.  
 
The next section sets out the analytical framework, the subsequent two chapters 
examine the current state of 'externalization' on a regional and global level, and the 
conclusions discuss some implications of the findings.  
 
Three Political Dimensions of Externalizing the Internal Market 
 
In order to analyze the political aspects of the internal market's external dimension, I 
draw on all three dimensions: the institutional dimension or structure (polity), the 
contents or issue areas (policy) and the procedural dimension (politics). Polity thus 
relates to the institutional set-up that the EU has established with a third country; the 
policies may, for instance, cover trade in goods and services, labor migration or 
foreign direct investment; and politics embraces processes of decision-making or 
implementation such as the diffusion mechanisms for the EU's internal market norms. 
The three dimensions are clearly interdependent.  
 
Table 1 combines policies (the internal market issues covered) and polity (the degree 
of institutionalization) and provides prominent examples in each cell of the matrix. In 
general, the broader the coverage, the more likely the cooperation constitutes 
deep integration (covering behind-the-border issues) rather than just shallow 
integration (measures applied at the border).7 And the more institutionalized the 
relationship, the tighter the form of cooperation in terms of emulating the EU's 
institutional setup. The EEA, the Accession Partnerships that prepare candidates for 
EU membership and Switzerland's many bilateral agreements with the EU provide the 
most far-reaching coverage of internal market policies. In terms of institutionalization, 
the EEA offers the closest internal market association, followed by the EU-Turkey 
customs union and the sectoral Energy Community Treaty with the Western Balkan 
countries. The still rather young European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) builds on the 
existing Partnership and Cooperation agreements (PCAs) and the Euro-
Mediterranean association agreements and adds country-specific 'stakes' in the 
internal market with the aid of ENP action plans.8 Among the less intense forms of 
cooperation are the bilateral (or bi-regional) free trade agreements that the EU has 
concluded with non-European countries like Mexico, Chile and South Africa, is 
negotiating with Mercosur or the Gulf Cooperation Council or plans to negotiate with 
                                                            
7   It is interesting to note that there are also internal market norms which the EU is less keen to 
export such as the free movement of workers or agricultural trade concessions.  
8   This rough classification is variable. Turkey, for instance, is moving down towards broader 
issue coverage (and an Accession Partnership), as do the ENP action compared to the 
legal agreements on which they are based.  Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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other emerging markets such as South Korea and India. The loosest forms of 
cooperation are regulatory dialogues or other EU attempts to act as a global 
standard setter by exporting its internal market norms to third countries or 
international fora.  
 
Table 1: Forms of Internal Market Externalization: Polity and Policies 
 
  Polity – degree of institutionalization 
 low  medium  high 
low  regulatory dialo-
gues, global 
standard setting 
Partnership and 
Cooperation 
Agreements 
Energy Commu-
nity Treaty 
medium  free trade 
agreements  
EuroMed asso-
ciation agree-
ments, Stabiliza-
tion and Associa-
tion Agreements, 
ENP action plans 
EU-Turkey 
customs union 
 
 
 
 
Policies – 
coverage of 
internal market 
issues 
high  EU-Swiss bilateral 
agreements 
Accession 
Partnerships 
European Econo-
mic Area 
 
As a third dimension, politics comprises the processes, tools and mechanisms of 
internal market externalization (together with the actors' power constellations). The 
more the internal market alignment is based on the acquis, the more likely a 
d y n a m i c  a p p r o a c h  t h a t  a l l o w s  f o r  a n  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  acquis (and the more 
powerful the EU position). Table 2 distinguishes three types of processes according to 
the degree of alignment with the EU's internal market acquis. First, the adoption of 
the  acquis constitutes the highest degree of alignment as the partner country 
unilaterally adapts to given EU norms. This is the case in accession negotiations, 
internal market association (e.g. EEA) or customs union agreements (e.g. Andorra, 
San Marino, Turkey). The Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) with the 
Western Balkan countries also involve alignment with the acquis in many areas, as do 
a few sectoral agreements such as the Energy Community Treaty or the EU-Swiss 
agreements on civil aviation and Schengen/Dublin association.  
 
The second process is 'reciprocal liberalization' in terms of a mutual undertaking 
among notionally equal partners. Agreements between the EU and third states may 
reproduce trade liberalization provisions contained in the EC Treaty. Examples are 
the bilateral free trade agreements that the EU has concluded with countries like 
Switzerland, Mexico, Chile or South Africa. Moreover, mutual recognition agreements 
(avoiding unnecessary duplication of certification by accepting each other's 
conformity assessments) or the recognition of equivalence (recognizing foreign rules 
with the same regulatory objective as conform to domestic rules) may fall into this 
category.  EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2007 
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Third, 'standard setting' in a broad sense takes place on the international level with 
the EU in a weaker position, trying to influence its partners' policy. A case in point are 
regula tory  dia logues ( e.g. with the U S or Japan) that serve to mak e each other's 
regulatory system more understandable and compatible, but also efforts at 
international standardization (elaborating and using international standards for 
regulation) or international harmonization (drawing up common rules). The European 
standardization organizations9 cooperate closely with the EU (and the EFTA states), 
inter alia, in order "to provide candidate countries and neighbouring countries with a 
major tool for the facilitation of adaptation of their economies to the Community 
market" and to encourage the use of European standards "as an instrument of 
economic and technological integration within and outside the European market" 
(European Union 2003: 9-10). They also work closely with the international 
standardization bodies (such as the International Standardization Organization or the 
International Electrotechnical Commission). Furthermore, the Union since the mid-
1990s shows a "propensity to 'export' actively to partner countries its model of 
regional integration" as a complement to its own relations with a region (Maur 2005: 
1567).  
 
Table 2: Forms of Internal Market Externalization: Politics  
 
high  adoption of 
the acquis 
accession process 
internal market association 
customs union agreement 
'quasi-supranational' sectoral agreement 
medium  'reciprocal 
liberalization' 
bilateral free trade agreement  
mutual recognition agreement 
recognition of equivalence 
 
 
 
Politics – 
degree of 
internal 
market 
alignment  low  'standard 
setting' 
regulatory dialogue 
international standardization 
international harmonization 
export of 'regional model' 
 
Many instruments, for instance financial aid or technical assistance to support the 
partner's capacity-building (including the fulfilment of EU requirements), may be 
found in all three categories. To varying degrees, the different tools rely on incentives 
                                                            
9   The internal market's 'new approach' twenty years ago limited the regulatory function of 
the EU institutions to specifying 'essential requirements' that products or services must meet 
in terms of health, safety, environmental or consumer protection and delegated the task 
of developing detailed standards to private European standardization organizations such 
as CEN (Comité européen de normalisation), CENELEC (Comité européen de 
normalisation électrotechnique) or ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute). Drawing on the input of interested parties, these bodies prepare voluntary 
standards at the request of industry or the European Commission. Compliance with 
'harmonized standards' (that is, standards adopted by CEN, CENELEC or ETSI, following a 
Commission mandate) provides presumption of conformity to the corresponding 'essential 
requirements' of EC directives.  Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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– attempting to induce the partners to embark on certain policies out of material 
self-interest – or on persuasion – aiming at a change of the partners' preferences and 
collective identities through discourse. In other words, third countries may adopt 
internal market rules either because they want to obtain the rewards that come with 
the 'policy import' (or avoid the costs of non-compliance) or because they view 
these EU norms as appropriate and legitimate. Deliberation and persuasion are 
particularly important when the acquis as such needs to be adopted and 
implemented, but mutual recognition also requires a high degree of trust on both 
sides, and 'selling' the regional integration model abroad is likely to involve intense 
discourse as well. Finally, the export of internal market norms tends to be stronger in 
the EU's immediate vicinity. "Through the EEA and increasingly through the European 
neighbourhood policy the rules and standards of the single market stretch beyond 
the borders of the EU" (European Commission 2007b: 5).  
 
The Neighbours' Stake in the Internal Market  
 
Some of the EU's neighbouring countries are taking over the acquis communautaire 
either in its entirety through accession negotiations or partly through an internal 
market association, a customs union or sectoral agreements.  
 
The enlargement process is probably the best example of an externalization of the 
internal market. Candidate countries must, inter alia, align their regulatory systems 
with the EU in order to be able to fully participate in the internal market, and they 
need to develop the necessary administrative capacity to implement the acquis.10 
Such an obligation is "difficult to reconcile with the sovereignty requirements" 
considering that the candidates do not participate in the drafting of the acquis "until 
the eventual future membership has taken place" (Albi 2001: 201). The EU is currently 
negotiating accession with Croatia and Turkey. Macedonia has obtained candidate 
status but not yet opened negotiations. Since the mid-1990s the EU uses a 'pre-
accession strategy' to prepare candidates for membership. This strategy usually 
consists of bilateral agreements with the candidate countries (e.g. Europe 
Agreements), Accession Partnerships, opening of Community programmes and 
agencies, pre-accession assistance and political dialogue (Maresceau 2003). 
Accession partnerships determine the short-term priorities and medium-term 
objectives on the basis of the 'Copenhagen criteria' and the specific needs on which 
financial assistance should be targeted. The candidate country draws up a national 
                                                            
10   The approximation of law under the Europe Agreements covered about 80'000 pages of 
acquis, including the Treaties, secondary legislation, case law, soft law and international 
agreements, as well as some policies which have not been adopted by all the member 
states (e.g. Schengen, monetary union). The Accession Partnerships added areas beyond 
EU competences such as judicial reform, prison conditions, social security or civil service 
reform. EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2007 
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programme for the adoption of the acquis, which sets out a timetable for putting the 
partnership into effect. A regular evaluation of the candidates' progress is carried out 
by the Commission. The accession process clearly aims at full integration into the 
policies and polity of the EU. As Grabbe (2001: 1014) points out, studies of 
Europeanization have mainly focused on EU member states, "yet the EU exerts similar 
pressures on the applicant countries". This reasoning has to be taken a step further: 
evidence of 'external Europeanization' – the extension of EU norms to non-member 
countries – "can be found globally" (Magen 2006: 386).  
 
Stopping short of EU membership at the time of its conclusion in 1992, the European 
Economic Area covers the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, 
competition rules as well as horizontal policies (e.g. environment, social policies, 
consumer protection, statistics and company law) and flanking policies (e.g. 
cooperation in research and development or education). The principle of mutual 
recognition has been extended to goods originating in the EEA; and the national 
standards bodies of the EFTA states are members of CEN and CENELEC. The EEA 
constitutes an extended free trade area which is best described as an internal 
market association between the Community and the countries of the European Free 
Trade Association, with the exception of Switzerland. It excludes in particular the EU's 
external relations11, the common agricultural, fisheries and transport policies12, budget 
contributions and regional policy13, taxation, economic and monetary policy.  
 
The Commission retains the exclusive right to initiative, whereas the EFTA countries have 
the right to raise a matter of concern at the EEA level at any time (droit d'évocation). 
EFTA experts are consulted by the Commission in the preparatory stage of new 
measures. The main discussions take place within the EEA Joint Committee in the so-
called decision-shaping phase after the Commission transmitted its proposals to the EU 
Council and to the EFTA states (Reymond 1993). The EEA Joint Committee decides by 
consensus as closely as possible in time to the adoption of the same rules by the EU 
Council in order to allow for a simultaneous application. In case of an opt-out, the EFTA 
countries, which need to speak with one voice, face the threat of a suspension of 
related parts of the Agreement. In addition, the EEA Council meets at ministerial level 
twice a year to give political impetus, and an EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee and 
an EEA Joint Consultative Committee for the economic and social partners act as 
advisory bodies. On the EFTA side surveillance and enforcement is carried out by the 
                                                            
11   Nevertheless, EFTA follows a policy of 'shadowing' the EU in concluding trade agreements, 
Norway and Iceland are closely associated with the EU on foreign, security and defence 
policies and through the Schengen and Dublin association agreements. 
12   The sensitive issues of Alpine transit and Nordic fisheries, like trade in agricultural products, 
were dealt with separately in bilateral agreements with the EFTA states concerned. 
13   However, the EFTA countries had to establish a financial mechanism to contribute to the 
reduction of social and economic disparities in Europe. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court. The principles of primacy and direct 
effect of EEA law apply. In order to secure a uniform interpretation of EEA rules, the EEA 
Joint Committee reviews the development of the case law of the European Court of 
Justice and the EFTA Court. 
 
The EEA combines a rather comprehensive 'policy integration' into the internal 
market with a limited participation in terms of 'polity' despite an elaborate two-pillar 
system. EEA legislation 'mirrors' any relevant new acquis but EFTA lacks a real right of 
co-decision.14 As a result, most EFTA states joined the EU in 1995, Switzerland opted 
out of the EEA through a negative referendum in 1992, which also lead to a 'freezing' 
of its EU membership bid, and the 'EEA EFTA pillar' was reduced to Norway (whose 
referendum on EU membership failed), Iceland and Liechtenstein. The EEA has most 
likely set the maximum limits of how the EU deals with third countries' request to 
participate in its decision-making procedure. 
 
Instead, Switzerland pursued a bilateral approach to integration, building mainly on 
its 1972 free trade agreement, and in two 'package deals' in 1999 and 2004 
concluded sixteen sectoral agreements with the EU.15 Most of the agreements of 
these 'bilaterals I and II' are based on the notion of equivalence of laws between the 
two parties (cf. Felder 2001 and 2006).16 In contrast to the EEA Agreement, the Cassis 
de Dijon principle is not included in the bilateral agreement on technical barriers to 
trade. The Commission consults with Swiss experts in the fields where Swiss legislation is 
recognized as equivalent, and in a few EU committees Switzerland has observer 
status. Typically, the Joint Committee set up by each bilateral agreement may make 
technical changes to the annexes of the agreement but not add new obligations. 
However, there are three 'partial integration' agreements where Switzerland has 
agreed to accept the acquis: in the area of air transport (where the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice have competences in surveillance 
and arbitration in specified areas) and in the Schengen and Dublin association 
agreements, where new acquis requires approval from the Swiss legislature (but in 
case of a refusal, the agreement could be terminated). These associations foresee 
an adaptation to new acquis in the future, and Swiss representatives participate 
without a vote in the Commission's comitology and informal expert groups and, with 
                                                            
14   The idea of mutual recognition of equivalent legislation and common decisionmaking 
institutions had early on in the negotiations been abandoned, and later on EFTA's hope to be 
able to have a say on future EEA rules by 'buying the past' and taking over the existing 
acquis was equally frustrated (Gstöhl 1994). 
15   Free movement of persons, technical barriers to trade, public procurement, civil aviation, 
overland transport, agriculture, research, Schengen/Dublin association, taxation of 
savings, fight against fraud, processed agricultural products, environment, statistics, 
media, education, and pensions.  
16   This was facilitated by the fact that since 1988 any new Swiss legislation has systematically 
been compared to and if possible made compatible with the relevant EU law. EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2007 
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regard to Schengen, also in the relevant committees and working groups of the 
Council (Cornu 2006). Hence, at least in these sectors Switzerland participates in the 
EU's decision-shaping in addition to the Joint Committees established by the 
associations (which in contrast to those of the other bilateral agreements discuss also 
the evolution of the acquis).  
 
Overall, the scope of the EU-Swiss bilateral agreements falls short of the EEA with 
respect to both policies and polity. Switzerland's access to the internal market is more 
limited, perhaps most notably exemplified by the absence of an agreement on 
services.17 The 'pick and choose' advantage of the sectoral approach has been 
countered by the EU by linking Swiss wishes of cooperation to EU preferences (e.g. 
taxation of savings, fraud, financial contribution18) and by a 'guillotine clause' in the 
'bilaterals I' that was to ensure that Switzerland would ratify all agreements (in 
particular the one on the free movement of persons). Finally, the EEA provides 
greater opportunities for decision-shaping than the bilateral sectoral approach. The 
lack of "an overarching framework agreement means that there is less 
institutionalised political dialogue between the EU and Switzerland than between the 
EU and most other third countries" (Vahl and Grolimund 2006: 112). Opportunities for 
further bilateral rapprochement seem almost exhausted as it would increasingly 
touch on politically sensitive sectors, the Swiss lack of influence would further 
cumulate, and the Union early on made clear that it would offer less than in the EEA.  
 
Pursuant to their 1963 association agreement, the European Union and Turkey in 1996 
established a customs union and three years later, Turkey became a candidate 
country. The EU-Turkey customs union covers industrial goods and processed 
agricultural products, but not (yet) agriculture, services or public procurement. 
Negotiations to include these areas have been ongoing.19 Turkey had to adopt the 
common external tariff and align to the acquis in essential internal market areas, 
notably technical barriers to trade, competition policies and protection of 
intellectual property rights. The agreement makes use of the pan-European system of 
(diagonal) cumulation of origin and the principle of mutual recognition has been 
extended to goods originating in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey has to bring its trade 
                                                            
17   Negotiations on a bilateral agreement on services were suspended in 2003 because the 
two sides could not agree on the sectors to be included.  
18   The European Commission argued that "the EU-Swiss bilateral agreements overall gave 
Switzerland access to roughly two-thirds of the internal market" and therefore it should 
make a financial contribution of two-thirds in per capita terms of the EEA Financial 
Mechanism (Vahl and Grolimund 2006: 78). 
19   In fact, the association agreement had foreseen to include agriculture in the customs 
union but this was not pursued further; Turkey first needs to align to the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Moreover, the provisions of the Additional Protocol on the free 
movement of workers, services and capital were not implemented, and the EU's financial 
aid commitments were not met mainly due to objections by Greece.  Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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policy into line with the common commercial policy and, for instance, negotiate 
agreements with many third countries.20  
 
The Commission informally consults Turkish experts when drafting new relevant 
acquis, and further consultations may take place in the customs union Joint 
Committee. Turkey then adopts the necessary national legislation. To some extent, 
the customs union's consultation mechanism has been taken from the EEA, but "the 
flaws in the EEA provisions have been compounded by the failure to adjust them to 
reflect Turkey's involvement in the EC's trade policy" (Peers 1996: 423). Even though 
the EU and Turkey should act in tandem, Turkey cannot affect the (re)negotiation of 
trade agreements and is excluded from consultations on trade policy measures. In 
case of a dispute, the Association Council tries to find an agreement or may 
unanimously decide to submit the dispute to the European Court of Justice or an 
arbitration tribunal (Kabaalioglu 1997). In view of the supposedly temporary nature of 
the customs union, Turkey accepted to apply Community policies and legislation 
without taking part in the EU's decision-making process. The final goal of the 
association agreement was not the establishment of a customs union "but the 
completion of a real common market, thereby removing all barriers to factor 
movements between Turkey and the EC", including the possibility of a Turkish 
membership (ibid.: 158).  
 
In the framework of the multilateral Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU has 
negotiated bilateral association agreements with nine Mediterranean countries 
which in most cases replaced older cooperation agreements from the 1970s 
(Philippart 2003).21 The so-called Barcelona Process among other things envisages 
the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area for industrial goods by 
2010. In 2006 additional negotiations on liberalizing services, trade in agricultural and 
fisheries products and on the right of establishment have been launched, and the 
pan-European cumulation system is being inserted into the association agreements.22 
The association agreements emphasize the necessity to cooperate on standards 
and envisage mutual recognition agreements as soon as the conditions for them are 
met.  
 
In contrast to the Mediterranean neighbours, the EU's bilateral Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements with the transition countries to the East grant no 
                                                            
20   In this respect the customs union agreement goes further than the Swiss 'bilaterals', even 
though in the framework of EFTA Switzerland concludes many trade agreements with third 
countries almost in parallel with the EU. 
21   Agreements are in force with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Authority and Tunisia. The agreement with Syria has been initialled. 
22   The Pan-EuroMed Protocol allows to diagonally cumulate processing in the region in order 
to obtain preferential treatment. EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2007 
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preferential treatment for trade. The parties basically apply most-favoured nation 
status to one another with respect to tariffs on industrial goods. The PCAs feature 
mutual trade liberalization and political dialogue, supervised by the Cooperation 
Council whose decisions have no binding effects.23 The EU distinguishes between the 
'European' and the 'Asian' partner countries: the PCAs with Russia, Ukraine and 
Moldova envisage a free trade agreement as soon as circumstances permit, while 
those with the South Caucasian and Central Asian countries embrace no such 
perspective (Hillion 1998).24 Each Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is 
concluded for ten years, and the EU-Russia PCA is the first one to expire at the end of 
2007. Russia and the participants of the European Neighbourhood Policy may, after 
accession to the WTO, expect to negotiate enhanced 'deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreements' with the EU (Hillion 2007).  
 
Both the Euro-Med association agreements and the PCAs serve as legal basis for the 
European Neighbourhood Policy that the Union developed in the run-up to its 2004 
enlargement. After Russia's opt-out in favor of an individual Strategic Partnership and 
an extension to the three South Caucasian republics the ENP embraces sixteen EU 
neighbours to the South and East.25 The ENP does not offer an accession perspective 
but a deeper political relationship and economic integration based on a mutual 
commitment to common values (such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, 
good governance and market economy principles). Tailor-made bilateral action 
plans define the political and economic reform priorities for the next three to five 
years. With regard to internal market policies, they include measures to improve the 
respective regulatory systems on issues such as intellectual and industrial property 
rights, services, public procurement, free movement of capital, the right of 
establishment and company law. The Commission unmistakably states that the EU 
should "extend aspects of single market policy through the neighbourhood policy" 
(European Commission 2007b: 9). The action plans encourage ENP countries to use 
EU standards, join European standardization bodies and improve the exchange of 
information on regulations. 
 
The ENP action plans work with both incentives and discourse-based instruments 
(Gstöhl forthcoming). They resemble the Accession Partnerships. The incentives 
comprise, for instance, financial aid, preferential market access, technical 
assistance, interconnected infrastructure, but also suspension clauses in the 
                                                            
23   In contrast to an Association Council, it cannot oblige the parties to act or settle disputes. 
New obligations would require the conclusion of a further agreement. 
24   The PCA with Belarus was signed in 1995 but, due to the country's non-democratic regime, 
not ratified. 
25   The eligible members are Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and 
Ukraine. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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agreements (e.g. deferral of aid or withdrawal of trade preferences in case of 
human rights abuse). What the promised 'stake in the internal market' means has yet 
to be clearly defined, but is at least "understood to refer to a substantial reduction of 
(tariff and non-tariff) barriers across many dimensions of the internal market" (Dodini 
and Fantini 2006: 511). The Union has in particular left open the perspectives of free 
trade in agricultural products and of free movement of labor. The deliberative 
instruments are generally based on arguing and frequent interaction on multiple 
levels. They include 'joint ownership' of the process with a shared setting of reform 
priorities and monitoring of their implementation, policy dialogues as well as other 
interactive tools for the approximation of national economic legislation to the acquis 
such as the twinning of legal experts and targeted expert assistance (e.g. TAIEX). In 
addition, the EU issues regular reports that would allow it to 'name and shame' foot-
draggers and to create a certain peer pressure among the ENP countries. Besides 
the principle of conditionality (withholding certain 'carrots' and apply certain 'sticks' if 
crucial conditions are not fulfilled), the principle of differentiation states that the level 
of common values will affect the degree to which the ambitions are shared. That is 
to say, the EU does not intend to uniformly deal with the ENP countries as a group but 
to take individual progress into account.  
 
As an umbrella to the EuroMed association agreements and PCAs, the ENP carries 
the potential to cover many internal market policies in the future with several politics 
tools partly borrowed from the accession process. Regarding polity, it relies on the 
institutions provided by the existing bilateral agreements. Its future shape is still open, 
but a participation in the EU's decision-shaping is not foreseen – the ENP idea is 
"sharing everything but institutions" (Prodi 2002: 6).  
 
The countries of South Eastern Europe, in the context of the Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP) launched in 1999, are also increasingly aligning themselves 
to the EU acquis. Based on strong political conditionality, the SAP offers trade 
liberalization, financial assistance and new contractual relations in the form of 
Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs), an extensive part of which relate to 
internal market issues (Pippan 2004). It may be considered a 'pre-pre-accession 
strategy' since the European Council in 2000 officially recognized the Western Balkan 
countries' vocation as 'potential candidates' for EU membership. In the same year, 
the EU has granted autonomous trade preferences to these countries with duty-free 
and quota-free access to the internal market for almost all goods, including 
agricultural products (except for wine, certain fisheries products, sugar, baby beef 
and textiles). The SAAs will gradually replace these measures by asymmetrical 
reciprocal obligations and a free trade area for industrial goods. The EU plans to 
extend the pan-European cumulation system to the Western Balkans (and in a EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2007 
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second step an inclusion in the Pan-EuroMed system). Some provisions on the 
movement of workers, establishment, services and capital as well as a commitment 
to legal approximation in particular with regard to competition, public procurement 
and intellectual property rights are enshrined in the SAAs. To date such agreements 
are in force for Croatia and Macedonia, the agreement with Albania is awaiting 
ratification (with an interim agreement for trade in force), and negotiations with 
Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina have been opened.  
 
The key decision-making bodies are the Stabilization and Association Councils but 
the process is rather one of unilateral alignment by the 'potential candidates'. In fact, 
the SAAs resemble the former Europe Agreements and the 'European Partnerships', 
which identify short- and medium-term priorities for reforms, are modelled after the 
Accession Partnerships (Phinnemore 2003). The countries are expected to draw up 
National Plans for the Implementation of the Partnerships which will be monitored by 
the EU. The SAP countries also benefit from pre-accession assistance, twinning, TAIEX 
and the opening of Community programmes. In addition, the SAAs entail a 
commitment to engage in regional cooperation with the other SAP countries. The 
Western Balkan states (and Moldova) thus have concluded a network of bilateral 
free trade agreements which in late 2006 was transformed into a single regional 
trade arrangement, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which 
benefit from EU advice and technical assistance through the CARDS programme. 
 
The SAP also aims at the gradual re-integration of the region into the European 
infrastructure networks (e.g. transport, energy, border management). The most 
successful project in this regard is the Treaty establishing the Energy Community 
which entered into force in July 2006 and creates a single regulatory energy space. It 
extends the EU's internal market for electricity and gas to the region of South Eastern 
Europe (Walendy 2004). Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo/UNMIK, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia agreed to adopt the relevant acquis on 
energy, environment, renewables and competition. Moldova, Norway, Turkey and 
Ukraine are observers and have applied to join. In view of the EU's emerging external 
energy policy, the Commission and the High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy even suggest "to extend the EU's internal market, through 
expansion of the Energy Community Treaty to include relevant EEA and ENP 
countries" (Council of the European Union 2006: 4). The Energy Community's 
institutions consist of the Ministerial Council, the Permanent High Level Group, the 
Regulatory Board, the Fora (composed of representatives of industry, regulators and 
consumers and chaired by a EU representative) and the Secretariat in Vienna which 
assists the European Commission. It thus constitutes a sectoral but highly 
institutionalized policy area of internal market externalization. Even though the Sieglinde Gstöhl 
  18
Energy Community has no supranational competences, the Union has successfully 
reproduced itself. "The Energy Community Treaty is consciously modelled on the 
European Steel and Coal Community that was the genesis for the European Union" 
(European Commission 2005b: 1). 
 
An externalization of the internal market on a global level is evidently more difficult 
and less important for the European Union. Nevertheless, the EU increasingly 
attempts to export of its norms to more distant third countries and international 
bodies as well.  
 
Promoting Internal Market Norms on a Global Level 
 
Foreign exporters need to ensure that their products comply with the EU's 
requirements in order to be able to sell them on the internal market. On the one 
hand, regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures serve legitimate 
objectives such as protection of safety and health, the environment or consumers 
and the promotion of quality. On the other hand, they have a potential to impede 
trade. Even among the member states the internal market for goods is still not 
completed. Twenty years ago, the Community introduced the principle of mutual 
recognition of technical regulations from other member states. However, national 
rules still constitute important barriers due to the weak application and enforcement 
of the Treaty rules, in particular in the field of non-harmonized products, and many EU 
rules are still inconsistent or burdensome. The Commission has therefore recently 
taken different initiatives which will, inter alia, place the burden of proof on the 
national authorities denying market access, streamline and facilitate the various 
conformity assessment procedures and strengthen market surveillance activities 
(European Commission 2007a).  
 
To improve their market access, third countries may negotiate bilateral agreements 
with the EU, as many neighbouring countries have done. In the 1990s the EU has 
concluded agreements with more distant trading partners. For example, the free 
trade agreements with Mexico, Chile and South Africa provide reciprocal but 
asymmetric liberalization of trade in goods and services, public procurement, 
competition, intellectual property rights, investment and dispute settlement 
(Woolcock 2007: 5-9). In addition, the EU has already for a few years been 
negotiating bi-regional association agreements with MERCOSUR and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council covering similar issues and is about to launch new negotiations 
with India, South Korea and ASEAN. While the acquis clearly shapes its bargaining 
position, the Union has not very aggressively been pushing for harmonization with the EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2007 
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acquis in the free trade agreements (ibid.: 4). Nevertheless, it has a certain aspiration 
to 'multilateralize' the internal market by shaping foreign or international standards.  
 
Nicolaïdis and Egan (2001) argue that the success of European regulatory 
cooperation has had negative 'spill over effects' on outsiders such as the United 
States, leading to a demand for inter-regional cooperation and international 
standardization. For foreign partners the precondition for entry into the internal 
market became either to seek EU-based certification on an ad hoc basis or to 
negotiate a mutual recognition agreement (MRA). The EU thereby benefited from a 
'first mover advantage' by exporting core elements of its model (ibid.). Bilateral MRAs 
covering various industrial sectors are currently in place with Australia, Canada, 
Israel, Japan, New Zealand and the USA.  
 
Mutual recognition requires the development of a lot of trust. In recent years, the 
European Commission has therefore developed regulatory dialogues with key 
partners such as the United States, Japan, China, India and Russia. These dialogues 
serve to enhance the compatibility of policies, mainly in the field of financial services 
and capital markets, intellectual property rights and public procurement.26 Since in 
highly interdependent markets widely differing regulatory systems can create 
obstacles to trade and investment, "it is essential that the Internal Market legal 
framework is adequately attuned to the global economic framework in general and 
to key marketplaces in particular, and vice-versa " (European Commission 2005a: 3). 
This promotion of convergence does not go as far as harmonization or 
approximation of rules and regulations within the European Union. Most dialogues 
start with a process of confidence building and information sharing on domestic 
regulation before they engage in closer cooperation, including work on fostering 
convergence and recognizing equivalence of rules. Regulatory dialogues are only 
successful if they receive sufficient political attention and commitment. A further 
condition is that "dialogues mainly take place between the regulatory experts 
themselves, in a non-confrontational climate of expertise and understanding" and 
that they are kept flexible and informal (European Commission 2005a: 6). 
 
The EU aims at global standard setting by promoting "the adoption overseas of 
standards and regulatory approaches based on, or compatible with, international 
and European practices" (European Commission 2001: 8). It should be kept in mind 
that the 'export' of EU norms is not always a one-way street. Feedback effects in 
terms of 'norm imports' from international organizations might as well cause the EU to 
                                                            
26   Regulatory work is, of course, also done within multilateral organizations (e.g. WTO, WIPO) 
or international agreements. Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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bring its rules in line with, for instance, the relevant WTO agreements.27 The 
Commission recently called for more responsiveness to the global context and to 
"promote greater global regulatory convergence - including where appropriate the 
adoption of European standards - internationally through international organisations 
and bilateral agreements" (European Commission 2007b: 9). The internal market is 
expected to act as a standard setter on the international level:  
"It has spurred the development of rules and standards in areas such as 
product safety, the environment, securities and corporate governance 
which inspire global standard setting. It gives the EU the potential to shape 
global norms and to ensure that fair rules are applied to worldwide trade 
and investment. The single market of the future should be the launch pad 
of an ambitious global agenda." (ibid.: 7)  
 
Finally, a special form of 'standard setting' in a broad sense is the promotion of 
regional integration in other areas of the world, with the EU as a sponsor but not a 
partner in the new grouping. In the 1990s the EU first sought to persuade 
neighbouring countries to pursue regional integration among themselves. Examples 
include the Visegrad countries, the Baltic Free Trade Area, the Agadir Agreement in 
the Mediterranean region28, the customs union of the Gulf Cooperation Council and 
the new CEFTA in the Balkans. This policy has recently been extended to non-
European partner countries as well, for instance in the negotiations with the Central 
American or the ACP countries (Maur 2005). In view of the successful completion of 
the internal market, the EU has thereby increasingly emphasized its own example as 
a model to follow. This strategy complements the EU's bilateral trade and association 
agreements, which to varying degrees 'export' EU trade rules, for example its product 
classification, the pan-European rules of origin, trade facilitation measures (e.g. 
Single Administrative Document), EU standards (e.g. technical barriers to trade, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures) and regulations (e.g. competition policy, 
intellectual property rights).  
"First, the EU is using its bargaining power to win over partner countries into 
regional agreements among themselves. Secondly, Europe is becoming 
more directive: (a) using, in a series of recent agreements, conditionality 
to ensure that partner countries comply with the objective of South-South 
integration, and (b) offering prescriptions as to the format and content of 
the promoted South-South RTAs." (Maur 2005: 1567) 
 
                                                            
27   The WTO itself does not set standards but 'imports' the standards of other international 
bodies either through reference in its agreements (e.g. Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) or through its dispute settlement 
rulings (cf. Gstöhl and Kaiser 2004). 
28   It entered into force in 2006 and foresees free trade between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco 
and Tunisia, but any Arab country that is a member of the Arab League and the Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area as well as linked to the EU through an association agreement, can 
adhere to it. EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2007 
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Conclusions: Implications for Legitimacy 
 
In view of the fact that "the extraterritorial projection of EU rules and their impact on 
third country systems remains under-theorized" (Magen 2006: 387), this paper has 
taken a first step and examined how the Union attempts to 'externalize' its internal 
market by outlining the policies, polity and politics of third countries' involvement with 
the internal market. These three dimensions vary considerably, leading to different 
depths and dynamics of externalization. A shallow, static and loose form of 
cooperation does not provoke many worries about its implications for legitimacy. Yet 
the broader the coverage of internal market issues, the higher the degree of 
institutionalization and the closer the alignment with the acquis, the more likely is a 
deep, dynamic and tight relationship with the EU that may raise legitimacy concerns 
for the third country, which is affected by internal market decisions but not 
represented in their making.  
 
Whereas on the global level a diffusion of internal market norms is limited, the 
situation of the EU's closely integrated neighbouring countries deserves closer 
attention. An externalization of the internal market confines their policy options 
without recreating opportunities for rule-making at the European level. This poses a 
problem in particular for the more dynamic relationships which require an almost 
'automatic' alignment with the acquis, thus leaving little room for parliamentary 
control and the protection of the individual. Both the ENP and the SAP rely closely on 
the enlargement model which the EU developed for Central and Eastern Europe. 
Whereas this strong path dependency can arguably be justified with reference to 
the 'potential candidate' status of the Western Balkans, it is more striking in the ENP 
context. "EU demands for pre-accession legal and institutional alignment – however 
onerous, one-sided, and asymmetrical they may be – are legitimized by the prospect 
of full inclusion and the promise of future equality of participation" (Magen 2006: 
422). This membership perspective is absent in the European Neighbourhood Policy.  
 
By contrast, the EEA offers the EFTA countries at least a say in the decision-shaping 
phase of new legislation as well as own surveillance and enforcement mechanisms 
and – if they wanted to – the possibility to join the EU. For Switzerland three of its 
many bilateral agreements are directly based on an adoption of the acquis, but the 
cumulative effect of all treaties might nonetheless raise sovereignty concerns. Kux 
and Sverdrup (2002: 264) conclude with regard to both Switzerland and the EEA 
member Norway that "the process they are involved in remains formally 
intergovernmental, but the effects they experience are supranational". Turkey has 
not much influence in Brussels either, even with regard to economic and trade issues. 
"The Customs Union is thus undemocratic insofar as Turkey had to cede important Sieglinde Gstöhl 
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parts of its national sovereignty without being represented in the EU’s political 
decision-making mechanism and without having any influence on the multinational 
decision-making process" (Karakas 2006: 325). The EU decision makers are generally 
out of reach for third country nationals and cannot be held accountable by them; 
they can only vote their own national representatives out of office who might 
eventually have accepted a decision in an association council or similar body, 
facing the potential consequences of a refusal (e.g. suspension of agreements).  
 
A distinction is often made between input legitimacy (government by the people) 
and output legitimacy (government for the people) in the EU (Scharpf 1999). Even if 
the Union has deficiencies in input legitimacy, it may in some policy areas deliver 
output legitimacy through effective problem solving. Menon and Weatherill (2002) 
argue that the EU institutions may also contribute to input legitimacy compared to 
nation-states by taking into account interests (e.g. consumers, foreign exporters) that 
are often affected by decisions but excluded or underrepresented on the national 
level. With regard to the external dimension of the internal market, the input 
legitimacy is obviously very low given the non-members' lack of influence in the EU 
decision-making process, but to a certain extent "the realization of a more efficient 
market for Europe offers itself as a factor of output legitimation that can be taken as 
a justification for an apparent absence of orthodox input legitimacy" (ibid.: 120). The 
real question therefore is under what conditions economic (and political) gains, in 
particular in areas which surpass the governments' problem-solving capacity, may 
justify an adoption of the acquis and whether a membership perspective is on hand. 
In the long run, output legitimacy is not sufficient to balance a deficit of input 
legitimacy.  
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